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DRAFT	11/20/15		THE	THREE	CAUSES	OF	INVERSIONS:	REFLECTIONS	ON	PFIZER/ALLERGAN	AND	NOTICE	2015-79		Reuven	S.	Avi-Yonah	The	University	of	Michigan			On	November	19,	2015,	Treasury	released	Notice	2015-79	(the	“Notice”).	The	Notice	represents	Treasury’s	most	recent	response	to	the	second	wave	of	inversions,	i.e.,	transactions	in	which	US	corporations	become	subsidiaries	of	foreign	corporations	without	a	meaningful	change	in	their	underlying	business	or	in	the	location	of	their	corporate	headquarters.	It	follows	on	the	heels	of	the	announcement	that	Pfizer	Inc.	is	considering	a	merger	with	Allergan	PLC,	an	inverted	Irish	company,	and	supplements	Notice	2014-52	from	September	2014.1	Unfortunately,	just	like	Notice	2014-52,	the	Notice	is	unlikely	to	stem	the	tide,	and	is	even	unlikely	to	stop	Pfizer/Allergan.	For	that,	stronger	executive	and	legislative	action	is	needed.	To	understand	the	issues,	it	is	important	to	know	about	the	history	of	inversions	and	the	three	reasons	that	drive	them.		The	first	wave	of	inversions	lasted	from	1994	(Helen	of	Troy)	until	2001	(Stanley)	and	was	characterized	by	“naked”	inversions,	i.e.,	transactions	in	which	the	new	foreign	parent	was	a	shell	entity,	usually	incorporated	in	Bermuda	(but	resident	in	Barbados	for	treaty	purposes).	Naked	inversions	were	stopped	by	the	adverse	public	reaction	to	the	Stanley	inversion	following	9/11,	and	were	made	impossible	by	the	enactment	of	IRC	section	7874	in	2004,	which	redefines	the	new	foreign	parent	in	a	naked	inversion	as	a	domestic	corporation.		The	second	wave	of	inversions	builds	on	a	loophole	in	section	7874,	which	excludes	from	the	definition	of		“surrogate	foreign	corporation”	(i.e.,	the	new	foreign	parent)	cases	in	which	–	
 
(iii)	after	the	acquisition	the	expanded	affiliated	group	which	includes	the	entity	[has]	substantial	business	activities	in	the	foreign	country	in	which,	or	under	the	law	of	which,	the	entity	is	created	or	organized,	when	compared	to	the	total	business	activities	of	such	expanded	affiliated	group.2		This	exception	was	meant	to	exclude	“true”	mergers	with	a	foreign	corporation	that	had	“substantial	business	activities”	in	the	foreign	country	it	is	incorporated	in.	The																																																									
1 2014-42	IRB	712	(Sep.	22,	2014).  
2	IRC	7874(a)(2)(b)(iii)(emphasis	added).	
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IRS	defines	“substantial	business	activities”	as	25%	of	the	“expanded	affiliated	group’s”	employees,	assets,	and	gross	income.3	Because	of	this	rule,	second	wave	inversions	involve	mergers	with	foreign	targets	that	satisfy	the	25%	test.	However,	75%	of	the	combined	entity	can	be	the	old	US	multinational,	and	the	headquarters	invariably	remain	in	the	US.		In	fact,	both	Pfizer/Allergan	and	the	failed	Mylan/Perrigo	takeover	(the	two	most	recent	high	profile	deals)	involve	mergers	of	two	US	companies	that	are	only	nominally	foreign	(Allergan	and	Perrigo	are	“Irish”	and	Mylan	is	“Dutch”	but	substantively	they	are	all	American).	The	first	wave	of	inversions	was	done	for	two	reasons:	First,	since	new	foreign	parent	was	not	a	CFC	(as	a	publicly	traded	entity	it	did	not	have	any	10%	US	shareholders,	even	if	all	the	shareholders	were	US	persons),	it	(and	any	of	its	foreign	subsidiaries)	could	avoid	Subpart	F	restrictions	on	the	receipt	of	passive	income	and	base	company	income.	Second,	New	foreign	parent	could	engage	in	earning	stripping	transactions	with	old	US	parent,	in	which	up	to	50%	of	old	US	parent’s	income	could	be	“stripped”	through	interest	deductions	on	loans	from	new	foreign	parent	(in	the	case	of	royalties,	100%	stripping	is	theoretically	possible	since	the	earnings	stripping	limits	of	IRC	163(j)	only	apply	to	interest).	In	the	second	wave,	a	third	reason	was	added:	Since	most	US	multinationals	now	have	large	amounts	of	income	that	is	“trapped”	in	their	CFCs	and	cannot	be	brought	back	because	of	the	35%	tax	on	dividends	(including	deemed	dividends	under	IRC	956),	post-inversion	structures	were	devised	in	which	the	CFCs	lent	or	distributed	their	earnings	to	new	foreign	parent,	which	could	then	use	it	to	buy	back	its	shares	or	distribute	dividends.	Such	“hopscotch”	transactions	(bypassing	old	US	parent)	were	targeted	by	the	Treasury	in	Notice	2014-52,	which	recharacterizes	them	as	deemed	dividends	to	old	US	parent	under	IRC	956.	The	policy	response	to	inversions	depends	to	a	significant	extent	on	which	of	these	three	reasons	drives	the	inversion.	If	the	main	driver	for	inversions	is	Subpart	F,	the	solution	could	be	to	relax	the	Subpart	F	rules	(e.g.,	by	abolishing	the	base	company	rule).	But	there	is	no	evidence	that	recent	inversions	are	driven	by	this	reason.	When	the	first	wave	of	inversions	began	Subpart	F	still	had	real	teeth,	as	indicated	by	the	NFTC’s	1999	plea	to	relax	its	limitations.	Check	the	box	(and	its	currently	defunct	but	soon	to	be	extended	legislative	companion	IRC	954(c)(6))	did	away	with	this	problem,	and	other	than	956,	US	multinationals	no	longer	have	a	problem	with	Subpart	F	(as	indicated	by	their	ability	to	accumulate	$2	trillion	in	low	tax	jurisdictions	offshore	in	a	way	that	Stanley	Surrey,	the	architect	of	Subpart	F,	would	have	found	abhorrent).	If	the	main	driver	for	inversions	is	accessing	trapped	earnings,	the	solution	is	(arguably)	territoriality.	But	it	is	unlikely	that	this	is	the	main	problem,	because	(a)	hopscotch	transactions	were	targeted	by	Notice	2014-52,	but	inversions	continue																																																									3	Treas	Reg	1.7874-3	(finalized	June	3,	2015).	
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unabated;	(b)	not	every	inverting	company	has	significant	trapped	earnings-	for	example,	most	of	Perrigo’s	income	is	in	the	US;	(c)	other	corporations	with	huge	trapped	earnings	such	as	Apple,	Google	or	Amazon	are	not	inverting.		In	my	opinion,	the	main	driver	for	most	inversions	both	in	the	first	and	in	the	second	wave	is	earnings	stripping.	The	ability	to	reduce	the	35%	US	tax	on	US	source	earnings	by	half	(via	interest	deductions)	or	more	(via	royalties)	is	the	main	reason	that	inversions	result	in	a	steep	decline	in	the	overall	effective	tax	rate	of	the	inverted	company,	and	therefore	in	an	increase	in	the	value	of	its	shares	when	the	inversion	is	announced	(although	the	latter	may	be	short	lived	once	the	shareholders	realize	what	the	corporate	governance	implications	are,	as	shown	by	the	cases	of	Tyco	(management	fraud)	and	Mylan	(management	entrenchment)).	If	that	is	the	case,	should	the	answer	not	be	to	reduce	the	corporate	tax	rate?	I	am	in	favor	of	doing	so,	but	not	because	of	inversions.	We	should	reduce	the	rate	because	the	burden	on	domestic	US	businesses	is	too	high,	and	because	it	disincentivizes	genuine	FDI	into	the	United	States.	The	high	rate	(highest	in	OECD)	also	puts	a	lot	of	pressure	on	transfer	pricing.	Most	of	the	$2	trillion	in	trapped	income	probably	belongs	in	the	US	from	an	economic	perspective,	but	given	the	IRS’	record	in	transfer	pricing	and	cost	sharing	cases,	proving	so	will	be	very	hard.	But	reducing	the	rate	will	not	cure	inversions	for	the	simple	reason	that	it	is	always	possible	to	find	a	country	with	a	lower	rate	to	invert	to.	As	long	as	there	are	Ireland,	Luxembourg,	Netherlands,	Singapore	and	other	jurisdictions	with	very	low	(single	digits)	effective	corporate	rates	and	local	corporations	that	are	large	enough	to	meet	the	25%	threshold,	inversions	will	continue.	Saving	half	(or	more)	of	25%	(a	plausible	new	corporate	tax	rate)	is	a	powerful	incentive	if	the	rate	in	the	recipient	country	is	5%	or	less.	Thus,	there	is	no	solution	to	inversions	except	to	prevent	them	by	adopting	the	anti-inversion	rule	proposed	by	the	Obama	Administration	and	introduced	in	Congress	by	Sen.	Durbin	and	Rep.	Doggett:		1.	Redefine	the	7874	threshold	as	50%	(to	exclude	only	genuine	mergers	with	larger	foreign	partners);	and	2.	Require	moving	the	corporate	headquarters.		In	addition,	I	would	suggest	the	following	steps:	3.	Abolishing	the	“substantial	business	activities”	loophole;		4.	Adding	a	corporate	level	exit	tax	(deemed	sale	of	all	assets)	upon	moving	the	headquarters;	and		
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5.	Reducing	the	IRC	163(j)	limit	to	25%	and	applying	it	to	both	interest	and	royalties.	These	actions	should	permanently	solve	the	inversions	problem.	Inversions	are	simply	a	sub-type	of	corporate	tax	shelter:	Transactions	with	no	economic	substance	that	are	designed	purely	for	tax	avoidance.	In	an	ideal	world	they	would	be	struck	down	by	7701(o)	(the	economic	substance	rule),	but	since	that	is	hard	to	enforce,	we	need	more	bright	line	rules	to	prevent	further	erosion	of	the	US	corporate	tax	base	and	further	unfairness	to	ordinary	domestic	corporate	and	individual	taxpayers	who	are	left	to	pick	up	the	tax	tab.	But	what	can	be	done	about	inversions	in	the	absence	of	legislative	action?	The	basic	problem	is	that	most	inversions	are	driven	by	earnings	stripping,	and	it	is	hard	to	stop	earnings	stripping	by	executive	action	because	the	50%	limit	and	the	limitation	to	interest	and	not	royalties	are	in	the	Code.	When	it	issued	Notice	2014-52,	Treasury	suggested	it	would	look	at	earnings	stripping,	but	the	Notice	does	not	touch	it.	One	promising	avenue	may	be	to	redefine	“interest”	and	“royalties”	as	not	including	payments	to	“surrogate	foreign	corporations”	under	the	relevant	tax	treaties	(with	Ireland,	the	Netherlands	etc.).	That	would	subject	payments	to	30%	withholding	and	eliminate	the	benefit	of	earnings	stripping.	It	would	be	hard	for	the	Irish	and	Dutch	to	object	since	the	surrogate	foreign	parents	are	not	really	residents	of	Ireland	or	the	Netherlands	and	should	not	be	entitled	to	treaty	benefits	to	begin	with.	Instead,	the	Notice	takes	another	tack:	It	excludes	from	the	“substantial	business	activities”	exception	surrogate	foreign	corporations	that	are	not	treated	as	tax	resident	in	the	country	they	have	the	substantial	business	activities	in.	That	is,	if	the	foreign	partner	in	an	inversion	has	25%	of	the	combined	group	business	activities	in	Ireland	but	is	treated	by	the	Irish	as	tax	resident	in	a	third	country	(or	the	US)	because	it	is	managed	and	controlled	from	there,	the	exception	would	not	apply	and	the	penalties	imposed	by	section	7874	would	(i.e.,	taxation	of	the	inversion	gain	or	treatment	as	a	domestic	corporation,	depending	on	the	level	of	US	shareholders	after	the	inversion).4	There	are	two	problems	with	the	approach	of	the	Notice.	First,	it	depends	entirely	on	the	view	the	Irish,	Dutch	etc.	take	of	corporate	residency.	Managed	and	controlled	is	a	flexible	standard	that	can	mean	anything	from	the	actual	location	of	corporate	headquarters	in	the	UK	to	where	the	board	meets	once	a	year	in	Barbados.	The	Irish	and	Dutch	like	inversions	and	are	therefore	likely	to	define	residency	so	as	to	escape	the	Notice.	
																																																								4	The	Notice	also	addresses	various	techniques	to	adjust	the	relative	sizes	of	old	US	parent	and	new	foreign	parent	to	fit	within	the	parameters	of	section	7874.	These	are	unlikely	to	affect	most	inversion	transactions.	
4
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 120 [2015]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/120
Second,	like	Notice	2014-52,	the	Notice	depends	on	meeting	the	ownership	thresholds	of	section	7874.	This	leaves	out	a	transaction	like	Pfizer/Allergan,	because	Allergan	is	over	40%	as	large	as	Pfizer	and	therefore	will	never	be	a	surrogate	foreign	corporation	under	7874,	regardless	of	its	tax	residency.	But	could	something	be	done	about	Pfizer/Allergan	without	legislative	action?	In	my	opinion	the	answer	is	yes.	Unlike	most	inversions,	Pfizer/Allergan	is	in	fact	driven	by	the	wish	to	access	trapped	cash	in	Pfizer’s	CFCs,	because	(as	Americans	for	Tax	Fairness	pointed	out	in	an	excellent	report)	Pfizer	has	already	taken	a	reserve	for	the	potential	dividend	tax	on	most	of	these	earnings	so	that	a	successful	inversion	would	dramatically	increase	its	earnings	per	share	by	enabling	it	to	reverse	the	reserve.5	Pfizer/Allergan	is	not	affected	by	Notice	2014-52	or	by	the	Notice	because	both	of	them	depend	on	meeting	the	60%	threshold	of	Code	7874.	But	the	anti-hopscotch	rule	of	Notice	2014-52	is	a	recharacterization	of	loans	or	distributions	from	CFCs	of	old	US	parent	to	new	foreign	parent	(bypassing	the	US)	as	if	they	flowed	through	old	US	parent.	That	is,	the	approach	of	the	2014	Notice	is	tantamount	to	saying	that	the	CFCs	really	lent	or	distributed	the	funds	to	their	US	parent,	which	in	turn	lent	or	distributed	them	to	its	foreign	parent,	triggering	the	deemed	dividend	tax	of	section	956	or	the	real	dividend	tax	of	section	301.	However,	this	recharacterization	does	not	depend	on	new	foreign	parent	being	a	surrogate	foreign	corporation	under	section	7874.	If	Treasury	can	recharacterize	hoptscotch	transactions	as	flowing	through	the	US	under	substance	over	form	or	step	transaction	principles,	it	can	do	so	regardless	of	whether	the	ultimate	ownership	is	60%	US,	50%	US,	or	even	0%	US-	the	recharacterization	depends	on	the	CFCs	still	being	under	old	US	parent	and	new	foreign	parent	being	above	it,	which	is	true	in	all	cases,	regardless	of	the	identity	of	the	ultimate	shareholders.	Thus,	in	my	opinion	the	Notice	is	weak.	It	is	unlikely	to	affect	many	inversions,	including	Pfizer/Allergan.	But	Treasury	could	stop	Pfizer/Allergan	if	it	chose	to	do	so	by	expanding	the	scope	of	Notice	2014-52	to	include	all	hopscotch	transactions,	not	just	transactions	with	surrogate	foreign	corporations.		
																																																								5	See	http://www.americansfortaxfairness.org/files/Pfizers-Tax-Dodging-Rx-Stash-Profits-Offshore-Final1.pdf.	The	report	shows	that	Pfizer	is	losing	money	in	the	US	so	earnings	stripping	is	unlikely	to	be	the	reason	to	invert	in	this	case.	
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